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This research examined the role that the removal of the need or
ability to self-enhance can play in the misanthropic processing
of attributed behavioral information (i.e., remembering best
negative, internally attributed behaviors and positive externally
attributed behaviors). Experiment 1demonstrated that removing
a persons need to self-enhance by increasing his or her self-esteem
eliminated misanthropic memory, whereas misanthropy was
preserved for control participants and perceivers who had expe-
rienced a decrease in self-esteem. Furthermore, controlling for
participants self-evaluations eliminated the memory pattern
differences between the two experimental conditions. Experiment
2 demonstrated that canceling the ability to self-enhance by
having perceivers form an impression of themselves eliminated
the misanthropy effect. However, the misanthropy effect was
replicated whenperceivers learned about anunknown other.The
results were discussed with regard to the situations and factors
that can increase or reduce the need to self-enhance and their
implications for social information processing.
Memory for behavioral incidents accompanied by
attributions can be characterized as misanthropic
(Ybarra & Stephan, 1996). People recall two types of
attributed behaviors best: negative behaviors that are
internally attributed and positive behaviors that are ex-
ternally attributed. This pattern of recall is misanthropic
because people preferentially recall behaviors that cast
the target in the most negative light, that is, negative
behaviors for which the target is blamed and positive
behaviors for which the target is not given credit.
The misanthropy effect is important for various rea-
sons. First, it demonstrates a bias in memory that creates
negative perceptions of others (Ybarra, 1997). Second,
it is consistent with research demonstrating negativity
effects in social information processing (e.g., Anderson,
1965; Fiske, 1980; Hamilton, Dugan, & Trolier, 1985;
Hamilton & Zanna, 1972; Klein, 1991; Pratto & John,
1991; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Wyer, 1970; Wyer &
Gordon, 1982, Experiment 2). However, an important
set of questions that remains to be addressed concerns
the conditions under which people will and will not
display the misanthropy effect in memory. The present
research is an attempt at delineating some of these
boundary conditions by examining the role that self-en-
hancement plays in the processing of attributed behav-
ioral information.
Recent research has extended the misanthropic
memory findings to the perception of groups (Ybarra,
Stephan, & Schaberg, 1998). After being presented with
attributed behavioral information about group mem-
bers, perceivers showed better memory for negative be-
haviors that were internally attributedbut positivebehav-
iors that were externally attributed. Misanthropic
memory for group members was not affected by the
presence of group stereotypes or the knowledge that the
group was cohesive or loosely knit. Subsequent research
has shown that misanthropic group memory is affected
by factors important in intergroup perception. In a sec-
ond experiment, Ybarra et al. (1998) showed that the
misanthropy effect was preserved when people learned
about the out-group but that it was eliminated when
people learned about the in-group. These findings are
consistent with research showing the ultimate attribu-
tion error (Pettigrew, 1979), in which people attribute
negative out-group and positive in-group behaviors to
internal factors (i.e., the person) but positive out-group
and negative in-group behaviors to external factors (i.e.,
the situation) (e.g., Bell, Wicklund, Manko, & Larkin,
1976; Hewstone, 1990; Stephan, 1977). The Ybarra et al.
findings are also concordant with intergroup memory
research showing that perceivers recall more unfavor-
able than favorable traits about the out-group yet recall
more favorable than unfavorable traits about the in-
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group (Dutta, Kanungo, & Freibergs, 1972) and more
unfavorable behaviors about the out-group than the
in-group (Howard & Rothbart, 1980). As a whole, these
attribution and memory findings support the notion
that people are motivated to create a positive social
identity from the groups to which they belong by ascrib-
ing negative qualities to the out-group andpositive quali-
ties to the in-group (e.g., Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind, &
Rosselli, 1996; Tajfel, 1978, 1982).
Not only do people strive to create positive social
identities, they also strive to create positive individual
identities (Baumeister, 1994; Steele, 1988; Tesser, Mar-
tin, & Cornell, 1994). They can do so by ascribing nega-
tive qualities to others but not to the self. The misan-
thropyeffect inmemory for individualothersmay reflect
the selective processing of others behaviors in order to
enhance and bolster a positive view of self. That is, by
attending to and elaborating the negative internally
attributed and positive externally attributed behaviors,
perceivers can make favorable social comparisons (cf.
Crocker, 1993; Wills, 1981; Wood, 1989; Wood, Taylor, &
Lichtman, 1985). An implication of this reasoning is that
removing a persons need to self-enhance should elimi-
nate the misanthropic processing of attributed behav-
ioral information. One way this could be accomplished
would be to allow perceivers to affirm themselves prior
to processing information about a target.
Research has shown that perceivers who feel good
about themselves due to succeeding at a task or receiving
favorable personality feedback are relatively ineffective
at processing negative information about others (e.g.,
Crocker, 1993; Forgas & Bower, 1987). In contrast, per-
ceivers who feel bad about themselves due to failing at a
task or receiving unfavorable personality feedback are
relatively effective at processing negative information
about others (Crocker, 1993; Forgas & Bower, 1987).
This research coupled with the idea that people process
information about others to self-enhance, converge on
the suggestion that if people aremade to feel good about
themselves they should show a reduced tendency to
process attributed behavioral information misanthropi-
cally. It might also be expected that if made to feel bad
about themselves, people should show an amplification
of the misanthropy effect. However, given that the mis-
anthropy effect already reflects a biased recall pattern, it
may not be possible to increase the degree to which
perceivers can process attributed behavioral informa-
tion misanthropically, even though they might be moti-
vated to do so.
In the first experiment, increases and decreases in
self-esteem were manipulated via a success or failure
experience on an analogical reasoning test. Participants
were thendirected to an ostensibly unrelated impression
formation task, in which they learned about an unfamil-
iar other who had engaged in different positive and
negative behaviors that were attributed toeither internal
or external causes. A set of control participants who
received no success or failure feedback served as a com-
parison group. Following the reasoning proposed by
Ybarra and Stephan (1996) and the findings of related
research (Crocker, 1993; Forgas & Bower, 1987), it was
expected that participants who experienced a success
would show a decrease in themisanthropy effect because
their need to self-enhance would be reduced. In con-
trast, it was thought that participants who experienced a
failure might display an increased misanthropy effect.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Design and participants. Participants in the experiment
were 90 students who were distributed randomly to
either an increase in self-esteem, decrease in self-esteem,
or control condition (30 per between-participants con-
dition). All students were presented with positive and
negative behaviors that were linked to explicit internal
and external attributions. Thus, the design of the study
was a 3 (increase in self-esteem, decrease in self-esteem,
control) × 2 (valence of behavior) × 2 (attribution type)
mixed design, with the first factor varying between
participants and the latter two factors varying within
participants.
Self-esteem manipulation. Temporary increases and de-
creases in self-esteem were induced by having partici-
pants complete a test of analogical reasoning. The
manipulation involved having participants work on a set
of analogies that were pilot tested to be easy (success,
increase in self-esteem condition) or difficult (failure,
reduction in self-esteem condition).
Pretestingwas conducted on the analogical reasoning
test to assess how long it would take participants to
complete the test in both conditions and to assess par-
ticipants performance on the test. The pretesting
showed that participants in the success condition re-
quired approximately 4 minutes to complete the test,
whereas participants in the failure condition required
approximately 5.5minutes to complete the test. Because
both self-esteem conditions were run simultaneously,
participants were given 7 minutes to take the test to
ensure that all of them had time to complete it. The
performance on the pretest confirmed the difficulty of
the two tests. Participants in the success conditions an-
swered on average 19 of the 20 analogies correctly.
Participants in the failure condition answered on aver-
age 8.75 of the 20 analogies correctly.
To reinforce the perception of success or failure on
the analogical test, bogus national averages were pro-
vided as feedback. The averages were constructed in a
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manner that would guarantee that participants taking
the easy test regarded their performances as successes
and that participants taking the difficult test regarded
their performances as failures.
Manipulation check of self-evaluation manipulation. In
addition to responding to a question about their actual
scores on the analogical reasoning test, participants were
also asked to indicate their rank based on the national
averages feedback they had previously been given. Par-
ticipants were then given eight questions that assessed
their self-evaluations with regard to their performance
on the analogical reasoning test. Participants indicated
on a 10-point response scale (1 = not at all to 10 =
extremely) the extent to which they felt confident, happy,
disappointed, sad, competent, good, disapproving, and
bad about their performance. The items were reverse
scored where necessary.
Behavioral stimuli. The behaviors for the impression
formation task consisted of 24 statements previously
pilot tested and used by Ybarra and Stephan (1996).
Twelve of the behaviors were positive in valence, and 12
were negative in valence. The 24 behavior statements
were linked to attributions that referred to either the
persons disposition (internal) or the situation (exter-
nal) in which the behavior was performed. Examples
included the following: Bob was the first to ask the new
employee over for dinner because he looks forward to
entertaining (positive-internal), Bob returned the
change at the supermarket because the customerbehind
him noticed the mistake (positive-external), Bob was
fired from a job when he pretended to get hurt because
he wanted to get some sick leave (negative-internal),
and Bob looked at and tried to memorize the exposed
test answers because there wasmuchpressure to dowell
(negative-external).
This original stimulus set was extensively pilot tested
to ensure that no biases existed with regard to the behav-
iors valence (positivity and negativity) and equivalence
across the types of attributions (dispositional and situ-
ational). In addition, the behaviors were pilot tested to
ensure that the different attributions locus of causality
(dispositionality and situationality) was equivalent across
the differently valenced behaviors (positive and nega-
tive). To further ensure the generality of the stimulus
materials, a second stimulus set was created for the
present research by taking the original behavior stems
(Ybarra & Stephan, 1996) and linking them to attribu-
tions opposite to the ones they were assigned in the
original stimulus set (e.g., if a dispositional attribution
was employed in the original stimulus set, a situational
attribution was employed in the second set). Because the
equivalence of the valence (positivity and negativity)
across the different attributions had been established for
the behavior stems in the earlier research, only the
equivalence of locus of causality was assessed for this new
stimulus set (i.e., that the dispositional and situational
attributions wereequivalent across the positive andnega-
tive behaviors).
A set of norming participants (n = 16) rated the new
stimulus set for locus of causality. These judgments were
made on a 10-point scale that was anchored by 0 (very
external, situational) and 9 (very internal, dispositional).
The locus of causality ratings were then analyzed using
a 2 (valence of behavior) × 2 (attribution type) within-
participants ANOVA. The analysis produced only one
significant effect, a main effect for attribution type, F(1,
14) = 89.98, p < .0001. As expected, internally attributed
behaviors were rated as more dispositional than exter-
nally attributed behaviors (M = 7.62 vs.M = 3.00). There-
fore, in the new stimulus set, as in the original, internally
attributed behaviors were equally dispositional and ex-
ternally attributed behaviors were equally situational,
regardless of the valence of the behavior.
The behavioral stimuli were combined in booklets
that corresponded to four different presentation
schemes. The presentation schemes were constrained so
that each of the four types of behaviors (positive-inter-
nal, positive-external, negative-internal, negative-exter-
nal) appeared once in each of six blocks.
Procedure. Participants were recruited to take part in
an experiment on social information processing. On
arriving at the lab, participants were told that, in addition
to the impression formation task, they would be asked to
complete other unrelated tasks. For the first task, partici-
pants were told that they were going to help establish
local norms for materials to be used in an analogical
reasoning study the following semester. At this point,
participants were administered the self-esteem manipu-
lation via the analogical reasoning task. After partici-
pants completed the self-esteem manipulation, they
were given the correct answers so that they could score
their tests. Once they scored their tests and tallied the
number of correct responses, the experimenter pro-
vided the participants with bogus national averages. The
success participants were told they had performed in the
top 5%, whereas failure participants were told that they
had performed at the 30th to 39th percentile. Because
there were differences in the actual scores on the
analogical test within the two conditions, the feedback
percentiles were designed to be flexible.
Following the feedback phase of the self-esteem ma-
nipulation, participants were told that it is common
practice when norming such tests to allow for a delay
between taking the test and getting their reactions and
comments on it. In the meantime, they were introduced
to the impression formation task. Participants were told
that they would be forming an impression of a person
Ybarra / MISANTHROPIC PERSONMEMORY 263
named Bob by reviewing behaviors Bob had performed
in the past. Participants were presented with 1 of the sets
of 24 behaviors. The behaviors were presented at 8-sec-
ond intervals as participants developed their impres-
sions. Following the impression formation task, partici-
pants were given a 5-minute interpolated task that
consisted of labeling a map of the United States to
reduce working memory influences on recall.
A surprise recall task followed the interpolated task.
Participants were asked to recall and write down asmany
of the behaviors as they could from those that were
presented to them during the impression-formation
phase. They were also told that if they could not remem-
ber the exact wording, they could write down the idea.
They were given 8 minutes to complete the recall task.
After completing the recall task, participants were asked




To assess the effectiveness of the self-esteem manipu-
lation, examinations were made of participants actual
performance on the analogical reasoning test, their self-
reported ranks based on their test performance and the
bogus national averages, and the eight-item scale de-
signed to tap their self-evaluations. All three measures
were analyzed independently with one-way ANOVAs
with self-esteem condition (failure, success) as the
independent variable. (These analyses only included
the success and failure conditions because thesedepend-
ent measures could not be assessed in the control condi-
tion.)
All threemanipulation checkmeasures indicated that
the self-esteem manipulation was effective. The test
scores indicated that participants in the success condi-
tion (M = 19.41) did better on the test than participants
in the failure condition (M = 10.28), F(1, 58) = 589.21,
p < .0001. Participants in the success conditions also
indicated that their ranking based on their test perform-
ance was much higher (M = 9.87) than participants in
the failure condition (M = 4.93), F(1, 58) = 662.56, p <
.0001. Finally, the responses to the self-evaluation items
(Cronbachs alpha = .94) indicated that participants in
the success condition evaluated themselves more posi-
tively (M = 7.87) than did participants in the failure
condition (M = 4.60), F(1, 58) = 111.74, p < .0001.
Furthermore, a check on participants scoring of their
tests indicated that a number of failure but no success
participants made errors in scoring in a self-enhancing
direction. In sum, success participants did better on the
analogical reasoning test than did failure participants,
and they also knew that their performance represented
a success, whereas failure participants knew their per-
formance represented a failure.
Recall
Participants were given credit for correctly recalling a
behavior if they produced the gist of the originally pre-
sented itemboth the behavior and the associated attri-
bution. Half credit was given if participants recalled a
behavior stem without the attribution, but no credit was
given if an attribution was recalledwithout its designated
behavior stem.1 Participants recall was submitted to a 3
(increase in self-esteem, decrease in self-esteem, con-
trol) × 2 (valence of behavior) × 2 (attribution type)
mixed design, with repeated measures on the latter two
factors. The analysis yielded the interaction of valence
and attribution type that characterizes the misanthropy
effect, F(1, 87) = 10.31, p < .001. However, the analysis
also yielded the predicted three-way interaction of self-
esteem condition, valence of behavior, and attribution
type, F(2, 87) = 9.22, p < .0002. Table 1 contains the recall
means for thedifferently attributed positive andnegative
behaviors across the success, control, and failure condi-
tions. For ease of exposition, the different behaviors
were classified as misanthropic (negative-internal and
positive-external) or nonmisanthropic (negative-exter-
nal and positive-internal). Simple effects analyses indi-
cated that people in the control condition recalledmore
misanthropic than nonmisanthropic behaviors (M dif-
ference = 1.40), F(1, 29) = 10.35, p < .003. In contrast,
people in the success condition recalled more nonmis-
anthropic than misanthropic behaviors (M difference =
.67), F(1, 29) = 3.46, p < .03. The difference in differ-
ences is reliable, F(1, 58) = 13.45, p < .0005.
The recall pattern in the failure condition also dif-
fered from the success condition. People in the failure
condition recalled more misanthropic than nonmisan-
thropic behaviors (Mdifference = 1.52), F(1, 29) = 13.28,
p < .001. Compared to the recall pattern of the success
condition described above (M difference = .67), the
TABLE 1: Overall Recall of the Differently Attributed Positive and
Negative Behaviors Across Self-Evaluation Conditions
Attribution Type










264 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
difference in differences is reliable, F(1, 58) = 15.80, p <
.0002. Thus, as expected, a success induction eliminated
themisanthropic processing of attributedbehaviors rela-
tive to the control and failure conditions. The failure
condition did not increase the misanthropy effect. The
difference in the recall of misanthropic and nonmisan-
thropic behaviors was equivalent between the control
and failure conditions, F(1. 58) < 1.00.2
Although the memory patterns are consistent with
the notion that removing a persons need to self-en-
hance should eliminate the misanthropic processing of
attributed behavioral information, it is of interest to
examine the memory patterns when controlling for par-
ticipants self-evaluations. If the degree of participants
need to self-enhance underlies the extent of misan-
thropic information processing, controlling for partici-
pants self-evaluations should reduce the interaction of
behavior type and self-esteem condition. Participants
recall was submitted to a 2 (self-esteem condition: fail-
ure, success) × 2 (behavior type: misanthropic, nonmis-
anthropic) mixed design ANCOVA, controlling for self-
evaluations (composite index of how confident, happy,
disappointed, sad, competent, good, disapproving, and
bad they felt about their performance). Compared to
the original analysis, which showed a strong interaction
indicating that the recall of misanthropic and nonmis-
anthropic behaviors depended on participants self-es-
teem condition, F(1, 58) = 15.80, p < .0002, in controlling
for participants self-evaluations, the ANCOVA resulted
in a substantially diminished interaction, F(1, 57) = 5.01,
p < .03. More important, the reliable differences within
the self-esteem condition were eliminated. Participants
in the failure condition no longer recalled more misan-
thropic than nonmisanthropic behaviors, F(1, 28) = <
1.00, and participants in the success condition no longer
recalled more nonmisanthropic than misanthropic be-
haviors, F(1, 28) = < 1.00. This analysis provides addi-
tional evidence that peoples need to self-enhance, or
lack thereof, underlies the misanthropic processing of
attributed behavioral information.
Examination of the overall analysis indicated that
there was also a main effect for valence, F(1, 87) = 8.13,
p < .005, and a main effect for attribution type, F(1, 87) =
10.71, p < .001. The former main effect indicated that
participants recalled more negatively valenced (M =
3.87) than positively valenced behaviors (M = 3.33),
whereas the latter main effect indicated that externally
attributed behaviors (M = 3.96) were better recalled than
internally attributed behaviors (M = 3.23).
DISCUSSION
The first experiment was conducted to examine the
effect that increases and decreases in self-esteem would
have on the processing of attributed positive and nega-
tive behaviors. Consistent with the hypothesis posited by
Ybarra and Stephan (1996) concerning the cause of the
misanthropy effect, the findings indicated that reducing
a perceivers need to self-enhance resulted in the elimi-
nation of the misanthropy effect. Control participants
and failure participants, by contrast, produced a replica-
tion of the misanthropy pattern, displaying a memory
bias for negative internally attributed and positive exter-
nally attributed behaviors. Furthermore, controlling for
participants self-evaluations eliminated the interaction
of behavior type and self-esteem condition, thus provid-
ing additional evidence for the self-enhancement
hypothesis.
EXPERIMENT 2
The findings of Experiment 1 indicate that reducing
a perceivers need to self-enhance by increasing his or
her self-esteem eliminates the misanthropic processing
of attributed behavioral information. Another method
of eliminating self-enhancement might be to deny peo-
ple the opportunity to self-enhance. Just as people do
not process information about the in-group misan-
thropically (Dutta et al., 1972;Howard &Rothbart, 1980;
Ybarra, Stephan, & Schaberg 1998), it might be that
processing attributed behavioral information about the
self would undercut the misanthropy effect. That is,
perceivers should not be able to self-enhance by process-
ing attributed behavioral information about the self
misanthropically. Recent research is consistent with
these ideas. For example, Baumeister and Cairns (1992)
have shown that when given personality feedback, peo-
ple attend to it less if it is unfavorable rather than
favorable. Perceivers have also been shown to be poor at
recalling information about the self if it is negative and
related to personal failure (Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982;
Silverman, 1964).
The second experiment sought to determine the in-
fluence that learning attributed behavioral information
about the self would have on the recall of the informa-
tion. Participants took part in an impression-formation
task, in which they either learned about an unfamiliar
other or were asked to imagine themselves as the insti-
gator of different positive and negative behaviors that
were attributed to either internal or external causes. It
was reasoned that when participants were asked to form
an impression of the self, it would be less likely that they
would process attributed behaviors misanthropically be-
cause such processing could not have positive implica-
tions for self. In contrast, it was expected that the misan-
thropy effect would be replicated when people learned
about another person (cf. Ybarra & Stephan, 1996)
because such processing can have positive implications
for self.
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Method
Design and participants. This experiment used a 2 (tar-
get: self, other) × 2 (behavior valence: positive, nega-
tive) × 2 (attribution type: internal, external) mixed
design, the first factor varying between participants and
the latter two factors varying within participants. Given
course credit for their participation were 46 randomly
assigned participants (n = 23 per between-participant
condition).
Target manipulation. For this manipulation, half of the
participants were told that they would be forming an
impression of a person namedBob. The other half of the
participants were told that they were to form an impres-
sion of themselves. The instructions were as follows:
One of the things that psychologists are interested in is
the way in which we observe and think about different
types of people including ourselves. This involves many
psychological processes and the experimental session
you will participate in today is concerned with several of
these.
You will be presentedwith a list of behaviors. (You are
to imagine that you are the one who performed these
behaviors). Your task is to read through the behaviors
and attempt to form a coherent impression of Bob
(yourself) based on the behaviors he (you) performed.
Behavioral stimuli and procedure. The behavioral stimuli
used in this experiment were taken from the first experi-
ment save for minor modifications. Specifically, for peo-
ple forming an impression of themselves, each behavior
began with the word I. For example, I did so and so
because. The presentation schemes were the same as
those in the first experiment. Participants were recruited
to take part in an experiment on social information
processing. On arriving at the lab, participants were
introduced to the task by reading a sheet of paper with
preliminary instructions about forming impressions,
which also included the target (self, other) manipula-
tion. After reading through the sheet, participants were
presented with the different behaviors. The remaining
aspects of the procedure were the same as Experiment 1.
Results
The same recall scoring procedure used in Experi-
ment 1 was used in this experiment. Participants recall
was then submitted to a 2 (target: self, other) × 2 (behav-
ior valence: positive, negative) × 2 (attribution type:
internal, external) mixed design ANOVA, with repeated
measures on the latter two factors. The overall analysis
yielded the interaction of valence of behavior and attri-
bution type that characterizes the misanthropy effect,
F(1, 44) = 7.99, p < .007. However, it also yielded a
three-way interaction, F(1, 44) = 9.54, p < .003, generally
indicating that the misanthropy pattern depended on
whether they had formed an impression of themselves
or somebody else. Table 2 contains the recall means for
the differently attributed positive andnegative behaviors
across the between-participants conditions. Similar to
Experiment 1, for ease of exposition, the different be-
haviors were classified as misanthropic (negative-internal
and positive-external) or nonmisanthropic (negative-ex-
ternal and positive-internal). Simple effects analyses in-
dicated that people in the control condition recalled
moremisanthropic than nonmisanthropic behaviors (M
difference =1.48), F(1, 22) = 17.77, p < .0004. In contrast,
people in the success condition recalled both types of
behaviors equivalently (M difference = .06), F(1, 22) <
1.00. Thus, the misanthropy effect was replicated when
people learned about another person, but the effect was
eliminatedwhen the attributed behaviors were imagined
to be about the self.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research sought to delineate some of the
conditions under which people will process attributed
behavioral information in a misanthropic manner. The
findings showed that people who experienced a success
did not display themisanthropicmemory effect. That is,
they did not recall negative internally attributed and
positive externally attributed behaviors better thannega-
tive externally attributed and positive internally attrib-
uted behaviors. Likewise, themisanthropy effect was also
eliminatedwhenpeople processed attributed behavioral
information about the self.
An explanation for the findings of Experiment 1 is
that people in the success condition, because of their
increased self-esteem, did not have a need to self-en-
hance. Removing the need to self-enhance eliminated
the utility of selectively processing and storing negative
information about the target. Control and failure par-
ticipants displayed the misanthropy effect because the
need to self-enhance was still active in these participants.
It might be suggested that positive affect in the success
condition and negative affect in the failure condition
were the outcomes of the experimental manipulations
and that this might account for the pattern of memory
TABLE 2: Overall Recall of the Differently Attributed Positive and
Negative Behaviors Across Target Conditions
Attribution Type
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results. If affect were the medium through which the
target information was processed, two outcomes might
be expected. First, it might be expected that positive
affect would guide information processing in a mood-
congruent manner (Bower, 1981). If this were the case,
then the most positive of the behavioral information
(positive, internally attributed) might enjoy an advan-
tage in memory. However, positive, internally attributed
behaviors were the worst recalled in the success condi-
tion. Second, it might be expected that the experience
of positive affect might have resulted in a reduced capac-
ity for elaborating information, whereas the experience
of negative affect might have resulted in extensive infor-
mation elaboration (see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway,
1994, for a review). Such divergent approaches to the
information would have resulted in a main effect for
overall recall, with the failure condition producing
higher recall than the success condition. However, there
were no differences in overall recall. Thus, the findings
of Experiment 1 appear to be more consistent with a
motivational view than with predictions based on mood
effects.
In Experiment 2, perceivers who were presented at-
tributed behavioral information about the self did not
show the misanthropy effect in memory. Misanthropic
processing under such circumstances has no positive
implications for self. If anything, misanthropic process-
ing of self-related information might result in an infor-
mational threat to the self (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992).
When learning about an unfamiliar other, the misan-
thropy effect occurs because such information process-
ing does have positive implications for the self byhelping
people to create a positive individual identity (Ybarra &
Stephan, 1996) in a manner that is similar to the way
processing negative information about out-groups helps
to facilitate the creation of positive social identities
(Dutta et al., 1972; Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Mackie
et al., 1996; Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Ybarra, Stephan, &
Schaberg, 1998).
An alternative explanation for the findings of Experi-
ment 2 is that perceivers may have found the processing
task difficult to perform in the self condition. Having to
imagine that they were the person who had enacted the
different behaviors may have required extensive cogni-
tive resources on the part of the participants. This diffi-
culty could thus underlie the lack of misanthropy in the
self condition. If task difficulty underlies the absence of
misanthropy under this condition, differences in overall
recall might be expected, with the self condition produc-
ing lower recall than the other target condition. How-
ever, there were no differences in overall recall. Thus,
the findings of Experiment 2 are consistent with the view
that processing information about the self eliminated
the misanthropic processing of attributed behavioral
information.
It is interesting to note that the reduction of misan-
thropic memory in both experiments resulted, for the
most part, in the equivalent recall of all types of informa-
tion. There was one reliable reversal in Experiment 1
showing the bettermemory of negative externally attrib-
uted behaviors when perceivers had experienced an
increase in self-esteem. This pattern of reduced misan-
thropy and not its reversal was also obtained for the
in-group in the experiment by Ybarra, Stephan, and
Schaberg (1998).When people explain their ownbehav-
iors or the behaviors of in-group members, they tend to
explain positive acts as arising from internal factors but
negative acts as the result of situational factors (Bell et
al., 1976; Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979; Snyder,
Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1978; Stephan, 1977). Given this
attributional egotism and in-group favoritism, it might
have been expected that in addition to a reduction in
misanthropy for self and in-group, there might have
been an amplification in the processing of nonmisan-
thropic behaviors. This should be expected because the
knowledge structures and processes that allow people to
engage in attributional egotismmight facilitate the proc-
essing of the more favorable behaviors. Instead, perceiv-
ers learning about the self or the in-group (Ybarra,
Stephan, & Schaberg, 1998) appeared to process the
available information in a manner free from biases.
The absence of self-serving or in-group biases in the
recall of attributed behavioral information may be due
to various factors. First, when self-esteem is high, there
is no need to self-enhance. With regard to Experiment 2
and the intergroup experiment (Ybarra, Stephan, &
Schaberg, 1998), when processing information about
the self or the in-group, the information is processed
against a backdrop of all of the other information the
individual possesses about the self or the in-group. This
information about the self and the in-group is likely to
be quite varied (in-group heterogeneity). Furthermore,
because information about self or in-group is not proc-
essed with the goal of making favorable social compari-
sons, the incoming information is simply assimilated and
is not differentially processed for enhancement pur-
poses. In contrast, when information is processed about
others, it is the only information available to the per-
ceiver. Similarly, information that is processed about the
out-group is processed against a background of limited
information. In both cases, information about others
andout-groups has clear implications for social compari-
sons. Finally, it is known that people engage in self-en-
hancing attributions in success/failure studies where the
relevance to the self is high (Snyder et al., 1978). It may
be that the present studies do not elicit this motive when
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the information is about the imagined behavior of the
self or when self-esteem is high.
In addition to self-enhancement, it is also possible
that misanthropic information processing serves other
motives. Emphasizing the bad in others may allow peo-
ple to bolster their self views, but it can alsobe functional
on amore general scale.According to such a perspective,
social perception is guided by self-protection motives
and the need to determine the safetyof the environment
(e.g., Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Pratto & John, 1991).
Thus, it is adaptive to assume the worst in others, per-
ceiving negative behavior as arising from dispositional
factors but not necessarily assuming that positive behav-
ior reflects good dispositions (Ybarra, Schaberg, &
Keiper, 1998). However, when people are feeling good
(e.g., Clore et al., 1994; Fiedler, 1988) or when people
are learning about themselves, these self-protective mo-
tives may not be active.3 As a consequence, people in
these circumstances may be less likely to elaborate mis-
anthropic information when they encounter it. And
given that the inactivity of the self-protectivemotive does
not imply benevolent or generous information process-
ing, there is no reason to expect that nonmisanthropic
behaviors should enjoy a recall advantage over misan-
thropic behaviors. Thus, such an account also helps to
explain the equivalent recall of all types of behaviors
whenpeople had experienced success or when they were
learning about themselves. In addition, it helps to ex-
plain why misanthropy was not amplified in the failure
condition in Experiment 2; for self-protection, all that
matters is that the misanthropic behaviors are encoded
and not that the perceiver ruminate over them.
Recent research in stereotyping and prejudice is con-
sistent with the present results. Fein and Spencer (1997)
have shown that perceivers will stereotype andnegatively
evaluate others after being threatened but not when the
self has been affirmed. These investigators, however,
have argued that derogation of others is likely only when
perceivers have adequate knowledge of the stereotype of
the out-group. The present findings (Experiment 1)
suggest that knowledge of stereotypes is not a necessary
condition for emphasizing the bad in others. Knowing
that another engages in negative acts or possesses nega-
tive qualitiesmaybeenough to trigger self-enhancement
processes.
The findings of the present research and those obtain
by Ybarra, Stephan, and Schaberg (1998) indicate that
the target of the impression has an impact on whether
people process attributed behavioral information in a
misanthropic manner. Targets that enable perceivers to
draw favorable comparisons facilitate misanthropic in-
formation processing, whereas targets that do not allow
the perceiver to draw favorable comparisons attenuate
or eliminate misanthropy. However, the degree to which
a target facilitates favorable comparisons on the part of
the perceivermay depend on the dimension of compari-
son. It may be that different situations make different
dimensions of comparison salient. An academic environ-
ment maymake scholarship particularly salient, whereas
a sports situation may make athletic ability salient. Peo-
ples memories of others may thus be closely tied to the
situations in which the others are perceived, with some
situations promoting negative perceptions and memory
such as misanthropy and other situations facilitating a
less disparaging approach to thinking about others.
It may also be that people from different cultural
traditions will process information about others differ-
ently. For example, Asian collectivists are less likely to
engage in attributional egotism and attributions that
favor the in-group compared to the out-group (Boski,
1983; Fry & Ghosh, 1980; Heine & Lehman, 1997;
Kashima&Triandis, 1986).As a consequence,perceivers
from such cultures may have less of a need to create or
enhance a positive view of self. This reduced need to
create and maintain a positive image of self may serve to
reducemisanthropic processing of attributed behavioral
information.
In conclusion, an examination of the notion of self-
enhancement in the processing of attributed behavioral
information not only allows us to investigate the bound-
ary conditions of the misanthropy effect, but it also
suggests how different targets, different situations, and
culture might bring about social cognition that is driven
to a greater or lesser extent by the need to emphasize the
bad in others.
NOTES
1. The scoring method was chosen for three reasons. First, person
memory research has historically emphasized memory for behaviors.
Second, a behavior recalled by itself is meaningful, whereas an attribu-
tion recalled by itself is not. The findings from Ybarra and Stephan
(1996) attest to this reasoning. Their internal analyses of the recall data
indicated that out of all of the behaviors recalled, 78% were recalled
with the associated attribution, 18% without the associated attribution,
and only 4% of the information recalled was composed of attributions
without behaviors. These results suggest that attributions taken by
themselves were not meaningful enough to be remembered. Finally,
neither the recall of the behaviors without attributions nor the attribu-
tions without their behaviors coincided with the misanthropy pattern
in the research by Ybarra and Stephan (1996).
2. It is possible that the lack of an amplification of themisanthropy
effect for the failure condition might have resulted from one of two
reasons, one methodological and one psychological. First, failure par-
ticipants on average reported that they had performed at the 40th to
49th percentile. Although anyone reading this article would regard
these percentiles as clear failure feedback, maybe the participants
viewed their performances as poor but not necessarily as profound
failures. Alternatively, it may be the case that misanthropic person
memory represents a ceiling effect; people have a tendency to engage
in misanthropy, so it may be difficult to get them to engage in more
misanthropy.
3. I thank the reviewers for this suggestion.
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